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previously sold has reverted to the landowners. These decisions
may encourage numerous landowners who plan to sell their land
to reserve the reversionary interests as well as the mineral interests, as a part of the consideration and price of the sale in an
effort to extend the life of a servitude beyond the ten year period
without user. They may also encourage the owners of land who
are about to sell mineral interests to delimit the term of the servitude so as to prevent the life of the servitude sold from extending
until the oil sand is drained, if there is production within the
life of the servitude. The implications of the decisions are many.
If they are permitted to develop without restriction to extremes,
the ownership of mineral interests in Louisiana may develop into
as complicated a system of land tenure as has developed in the
common law states where vested and contingent remainders, fee
tail and possibility of reverter interests create complications in
the ownership of land and minerals. The Louisiana court has
avoided such entanglements in the past and will no doubt avoid
them in the future.
R. 0. RUSH

STERILIZATION OF HABITUAL CRIMINALS
Human sterilization for social good has been one of the most
controversial problems of recent decades.' Legislation involving
the sterilization of human beings2 was first attempted in the
United States in the form of a measure introduced in 1897 in the
Michigan legislature.3 The first asexualization bill to run successfully the gamut of legislative approval was enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature in March 1905, but it was vetoed by the governor. The first such statute to receive both legislative and
1. See Comments (1933) 8 Notre Dame Lawyer 327; (1936) 24 Ky.
L.J. 220; (1937) 17 B.U.L. Rev. 246. See also cases cited and annotations
(1926) 40 A.L.R. 535; (1927) 51 A.L.R. 862; (1933) 87 A.L.R. 242.
2. Sterilization is usually accomplished by vasectomy in the male and
salpingectomy in the female-surgical operation the purpose of which is to
cut and seal the tubes through which the reproductive cells must pass. Often
in the case of the male the operation Is conducted under a local anesthetic
and requires about fifteen minutes. The patient need not be confined to bed.
In the female, sterilization demands an operation of more complexity: the
abdomen is opened and the patient must remain in bed for at least one
week. It must be emphasized that such operations do not in any degree
unsex the patient, but he Is irreparably precluded from producing offspring.
For a detailed discussion, see Landman, Human Sterilization (1932) cxi, xii.
3. This bill was defeated by only a few votes.
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executive sanction was passed in 1907 by the Indiana legislature.'
Shortly afterward numerous other states enacted similar statutes.'
Not until twenty years later was the constitutionality of this kind
of legislation tested in the Supreme Court of the United States.
In 1927 that court, in the celebrated case of Buck v. Bell,6 held
constitutional a sterilization statute which applied solely to the
insane and feebleminded. Other statutes have provided for the
sterilization of criminals as well as of the insane and feebleminded. These laws have usually been stricken by the courts,7
mainly on the ground 'that they were punitive and therefore unconstitutional as providing "cruel and unusual punishment.""
The Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was upheld by the state supreme court in Skinner v. State5 The statute
provides machinery for the institution by the attorney general of
a proceeding in the Oklahoma courts against any "habitual criminal" as defined in the act,'" for a judgment that such person be
rendered sexually sterile." Service of summons, time for filing
an answer, and the right to a jury trial are provided.1 2 The issues
triable in this proceeding are confined to* (a) is the defendant
4. Ind. Laws (1907) 377, c. 215 [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burney, 1933) §§ 22-160122-1612]. This act was held unconstitutional in 1920 as violative of the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution.
5. Conn. Pub. Act of 1919 [Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) § 2683]; Cal. Stats.
(1909) c. 719 as amended [Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1941) § 645]; New Jersey
Stats. (1911) c. 190; Kansas Session Laws 1913, c. 305 [Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Corrick, 1935) §§ 76-149 - 76-155]. As late as 1937 there were twenty-eight
states with valid sterilization laws: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. For a brief summary
of foreign laws and their administration, see Committee of the American
Neurological Association, Eugenical Sterilization, pp. 21-23.
6. 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. Ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584 (1927).
7. Iowa statute held invalid in Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (1914) as a
denial of due process, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment; Indiana
statute declared unconstitutional as denial of due process in Williams v.
Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921); Nevada statute held in conflict with
the constitution of that state forbidding the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. Mickle v. Henricks, 262 Fed. 687 (1918).
8. The case of State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912) seems to
be a lone example of where a sterilization law having a purely punitive purpose has been held constitutional. However, the state constitution forbade
only cruel punishment and was silent as to unusual punishment.
9. 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. (2d) 123 (1941).
10. The act by Section 173 defines a habitual criminal as a person who,
having been convicted two or more times for crimes "amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude" either in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any
other state, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and Is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution.
11. Sections 176, 177.
12. Sections 177-181.
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a habitual criminal within the meaning of the act? (b) Will the
operation be detrimental to defendant's general health? There
need not be a finding that the defendant's offspring will probably
inherit his criminal tendencies. Furthermore the defendant can
offer no evidence regarding this proposition. The statute further
provides for an appeal to the state supreme court from the orders
and judgments of the trial court."3 Finally, the act provides that
"offenses arising out of violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue
shall not come or be conacts, embezzlement, or political offenses,
14
Act.'
this
of
terms
sidered within the
It was argued in the Oklahoma court that inasmuch as the act
does not require a finding by the court or jury that by the laws
of heredity the defendant is the probable potential parent of children with criminal proclivities, the defendant is thereby deprived
of a full hearing. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma said that this
objection "really goes to the question of due process in relation
to substantive law, rather than procedure." The majority held
that this was a reasonable exercise of the police power in that the
15
act bears a real relation to the public welfare; that the finding
that a habitual criminal is likely to have children who probably
would inherit criminal tendencies is one which the legislature had
already made by enacting the law. "That determination by the
co-ordinate branch of the government having the duty to formulate the public policy of the state must be given great weight by
the courts."' 16
The dissenting opinion emphasized the idea that the failure
of the enaction to provide for a determination in each individual
case vitiated the statute under the due process clause of the state
and federal constitutions. Each contention is not without merit,
but it would seem that under strict principles of constitutional
interpretation the majority view is the sounder. The legislature
13. Section 186.
14. Section 195.
15. The court said on this point: "In every case, 'where the court is called
upon to decide whether a particular statute is a proper exercise of the police
power as against an improper infringement upon constitutional rights, the
court must, before it can strike down the act, decide that the existing facts
do not justify the conclusion of the lawmaking body that the law which they
have enacted bears a real relation to health, safety or public welfare." Skinner v. State, 189 Okla. 235, 238, 115 P. (2d) 123, 127 (1941).
16. 189 Okla. 235, at 239, 115 P. (2d) 123, at 127. Farther on the opinion
quotes from the case of Cuthbertson v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 50 Wyo. 441,
62 P. (2d) 311, 317 (1936). "The authorities go so far as to say that, 'if a
state of facts which would justify the legislation can reasonably be conceived
to exist, the court must presume that it did exist when the law was passed.'"
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has liberal discretion in the exercise of the police power, 1 and the
presumption of constitutionality supposes "that the legislature
has carefully investigated and determined that the interests of
the public require such legislation." 8 Constitutionality does not

necessarily mean social or scientific desirability. Furthermore, a
determination in each individual case is not without objection.
For example, each side could produce expert testimony and amass
evidence to substantiate its respective contention. In the very
nature of the case, testimony by expert witnesses on this question
would be highly speculative and a finding by a court or jury,
based upon such testimony, would likewise be speculative. Much
of the scientific information which such expert witnesses would
employ probably was considered by the legislature in enacting
the sterilization law. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Skinner case and, by a unanimous opinion, 20 reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court and declared the statute unconstitutional.
The question of due process did not figure in the principal opinion
but was the very basis of a concurring opinion of the Chief Justice.2' The act was stricken as being in contravention of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The statute applied to persons convicted three times of larceny, but expressly excepted those guilty of embezzlement. 2 Therefore, in view of the fine line of technical distinction between
larceny and embezzlement the court held that the act denied
equal protection of the laws. 4 "In terms of fines and imprison17. 11 Am.Jur. 1081, 6 R.C.L. 240; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 77
L.Ed. 288, 53 S.Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233
U.S. 685, 58 L.Ed. 1155, 34 S.Ct. 761, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1097 (1914); Manigault
v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 50 L.Ed. 274, 26 S.Ct. 127 (1905); Austin v. Tennessee,
179 U.S. 343, 45 L.Ed. 224, 21 S.Ct. 132 (1900).
18. Durand v. Dyson, 271 Ill. 382, 111 N.E. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917D 84 (1915).
19. "If a court or jury can make a finding of fact based upon such
speculative evidence, we see no reason why the Legislature cannot find or assume facts, based upon the same speculative evidence, as a basis for the
exercise of the police power." Skinner v. State, 189 Okla. 235, 239, 115 P.
(2d) 123, 128 (1941).
20. There were concurring opinions by Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr.
Justice Jackson.
21. He argued that there should be an opportunity to any individual to
show that his is not the type of case which would justify resort to sterilization, that is, that his criminal tendencies are not of an inheritable type.
22. "... . nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
23. Section 195 reads: "Provided, that offenses arising out of the violation
of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses,
shall not come or be considered within the terms of this act."
24. The court gives as an example the highly technical and arbitrary distinction between embezzlement and larceny by fraud. The latter occurs even
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ment the crimes of larceny and embezzlement rate the same under the Oklahoma Code. Only when it comes to sterilization are
the pains and penalties of the law different. The equal protection
clause would indeed be a formula of empty words if such conspicuously artificial lines could be drawn. 2 5 The court thereby
avoided passing judgment on the most important and difficult aspects of this kind of case-whether there was due process, both
substantive and procedural21 -and expressly reserved an opinion
on them. This would indicate that perhaps that high tribunal
considers it undesirable at this time to establish a precedent one
way or the other inasmuch as there now exists more vehement
27
feeling than scientific certainty relative to this problem.
It must be admitted that science has not yet told us that
criminality per se is inherited. Overwhelming evidence points to
the view that criminality as such is not, like blue eyes, carried
in the genes from one generation to another. 28 The consensus of
scientific belief is that criminal tendencies are not inheritable. 9
where the owner of the property delivers it to the defendant, if the defendant
has at that time "a fraudulent intention to make use of the possession as a
means of converting such property to his own use, and does so convert it."
Bivens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 521, 529, 120 Pac. 1033, 1036 (1912). But if the fraudulent intent should occur later, the crime of embezzlement, not larceny, has
been committed. Bivens v. State, supra; Flohr v. Territory, 14 Okla. 477, 78 Pac.
565 (1904). Thus whether a certain criminal act is larceny or embezzlement depends not on the intrinsic quality of the act but on when the felonious intent
occurred in defendant's mind. Concomitantly, whether defendant is to be
sterilized or not also reposes on this arbitrary distinction.
25. 62 S.Ct. at 1113, 86 L.Ed. at 1134.
26. In this connection the Court said: "We pass those points without intimating an opinion on them, for there is a feature of the Act which clearly
condemns it. That is Its failure to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1112, 86 L.Ed.
1130, 1132 (1942).
27. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson constitutes a faint
indicium as to whether the Supreme Court would consider the requirements
of due process met in a statute which extends sterilization to habitual criminals. He implies that the act would be invalid on this score when, after admitting that sterilization of the feeble-minded has been upheld by "this
court," he says: "there are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the
dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority-even those who
have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes." 62 S.Ct. 1110, at 1116,
86 L.Ed. 1130, at 1136.
28. Dr. Paul Popenoe, an eminent contemporaneous biologist and sociologist says after much study: "That criminality as such cannot be inherited
goes without saying. It is a social, not a biological concept. This fact alone
makes any proposal to sterilize criminals as such, unscientific, if it is based
on the idea of cutting off certain lines of heredity." Popenoe, Sterilization
and Criminality (1928) 53 A.B.A.R. 575, 577.
29. Eugenical Sterilization, A Report of the Committee of the American
Neurological Association (1936) 150-152; Myerson, Summary of the Report
(1938) 1 American Journal of Medical Jurisprudence 253; Jennings, Eugenics,
5 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 617, 620, 621; Montagu, The Biologist
Looks at Crime, 217 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social
Science 46.
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However, one writer claims that with the proper program of sterilization "at the end of three generations society will have to deal
with only an occasional biological 'throwback.' Crime as we know
it today would be extinct."30 Also, it has been authoritatively
said "that the differences between men are to no small extent
the result of inborn differences ....
Inborn characters are thus
of great importance and they are derived from the parents." 31
An intelligent consideration of the problem would not exclude
the possibility that scientific investigation in this connection may
be in its embryonic stage, and conceivably there is a closer relation between crime and heredity than now appears.
It must be said in arguing for the sterilization of habitual
criminals that definite proof that criminality per se is hereditable
is by no means the only justification for sterilization. The factor
of environment cannot be overlooked. Criminals move and have
their being in a criminal environment. The children of criminals
are born into such an environment, and to the extent that the
young strive to emulate their elders, they learn habits conducive
to anti-social behavior. It is more than possible that the offspring
of oft-convicted criminals will have no deep respect for the law.
They are not likely to feel the normal moral and religious restraints. The mere fact of their exposure to and intimate existence with hardened criminals would tend to make the children
of such individuals less susceptible to acceptance of socially prescribed modes. Habitual criminals are prima facie unfit to rear
their children as good citizens.3 2 Sterilization of habitual criminals would obviously prevent children from being born into such
3
an environment. .
The view that a sterilization statute must provide for a determination that the defendant's children will inherit his criminality
rests solely on the factor of heredity. It completely neglects the
powerful, inescapable, and omnipresent factor of environment.
Possibly the legislature did not minimize this consideration in
providing that its judgment should displace a special determina3
tion in each individual case.
30. Strother, Articles in The World's Work, July 1924, p. 282, Aug. 1924, p.
396, Sept. 1924, p. 556.
31. Alexander Morris Carr-Sanders, Professor of Social Science in the
University of Liverpool, in 8 Encyclopedia Britannica, 806, 807.
32. Popenoe, op. cit. supra note 28, at 579.
33. "The bad environment among which children of such families are
usually raised makes paupers, vagrants or criminals of many who otherwise
might have led useful lives." Holmes, The Trend of the Race, p. 94.
34. It should also be noted that it is not easy for the legislature to establish a legal standard by which Individual cases shall be judged.
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Finally, much of the opposition to sterilization is prompted
by the idea that procreation is a "God-given" privilege which is
sacrosanct and not to be expunged by a legislative majority. In
answer to this argument it may well be said that there is little
reason why a forfeiture of such privilege should not be one of
the prices which a habitual criminal must pay for his crimes.
Certainly if, in times like the present, the general welfare
demands a possible sacrifice of the very lives of the best of lawabiding citizens, it does not seem an intolerable imposition to
require a far lesser exaction from those who repeatedly display
their costly disregard for the general welfare.
OLI ER P. SCHULINGKAMP

